Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Capital Assests Financial Services v. Jordanelle
Development LLC, Bruce Riches : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Shawn. W. Potter; attorney for appellees.
Bryan W. Cannon, Stephen W. Whiting; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Capital Assests Financial Services v. Jordanelle Development LLC, Bruce Riches, No. 20100159 (Utah Court of Appeals,
2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2192

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE QlfJTAH
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL
SERVICES

APPELlLllrE BRIEF OF
APPELL^IT/PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Trial Court dipflNo. 090500770
JORDANELLE DEVELOPMENT
LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability
Company, and BRUCE RICHES, an
individual

Appellate Cam* # 20100159 - CA
Priority* 15^

Defendants and
Appellees.

APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JU1 | I A L DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUT
THE HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DISTl CT JUDGE

BRYAN Wj IfANNON #0561
STEPHEN i | | WHITING #11828
Attorneysftpljtkppellant
8619 S. SarJcflj Parkway, Ste. 111
Sandy, Utah §1070
Telephone: | | o i ) 255-7475
Facsimile: ffl§1) 255-7526
File Referen» No. 90020052

Shawn W. Potter
Attorney for Appellees
Tesch Law Office, P.C.
314 Main Street, Suite 200
Park City, UT 84060

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL
SERVICES

1

APPELLATE BRIEF OF
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Trial Court Civil No. 090500770
JORDANELLE DEVELOPMENT
LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability
Company, and BRUCE RICHES, an
individual

Appellate Case # 20100159 - CA
Priority* 15

Defendants and
Appellees.

APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
THE HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DISTRICT JUDGE

BRYAN W. CANNON #0561
STEPHEN W. WHITING #11828
Attorneys for Appellant
8619 S. Sandy Parkway, Ste. 111
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801)255-7475
Facsimile: (801)255-7526
File Reference No. 90020052

Shawn W. Potter
Attorney for Appellees
Tesch Law Office, P.C.
314 Main Street, Suite 200
Park City, UT 84060

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2

STATEMENT OF PARTIES

3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

3

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

4

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT

8

CONCLUSION

15

MAILING CERTIFICATE

16

ADDENDUM A, FINAL ORDER

17

ADDENDUM B, MEMORANDUM DECISION

20

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, P51 (Utah 2004)
City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1991)
First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987)

4
4, 11, 12, 13
13

Gloria Hayley Ashby v. Dallen Ben Ashby, 2010 UT 7,1 9 (Utah 2010)

5

Osguthorpe v. WolfMt. Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, P10 (Utah 2010)

4

Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97, 99 (Cal. 1963)

13

U. S. B. & M. Liquidation Corp. v. Hilton, 307 Mass. 114, 117 (Mass. 1940)

12

Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 489 (Utah 1979)

10

Statutes
Utah Code §57-1-20

6, 10, 11

Utah Code §57-1-23

6, 10, 11

Utah Code §57-1-32

passim

Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j)

3

Utah Code §78A-3-102(4)

3

Utah Code§78A-4-103(2)(j)

3

<

2

Comes now the Plaintiff and appellant, by and through its counsel of record, and makes
this appellate brief.
STATEMENT OF PARTIES
Plaintiff and Appellant - Capital Assets Financial Services
Defendants and Appellee - Jordanelle Development LLC and Bruce Riches
Defendant, Jared M. Jensen, filed for bankruptcy prior to the final order at the trial
court, and pursuant to the bankruptcy stay, Plaintiff is no longer pursuing its claim
against Mr. Jensen in this litigation.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j), the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to hear this appeal from a Utah District Court. Under Utah Code §78A-3-102(4), the
Utah Supreme Court has authority to transfer this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals,
which authority was exercised in transferring this case. The Utah Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court." Utah Code§78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue on appeal is whether prior encumbrances should be considered in
assessing the fair market value of real property foreclosed through a secondary deed of
trust.
"In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, P51 (Utah 2004). The opportunity to rule on the
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issue in this appeal was given to the trial court. Plaintiff argued in its opposition to the
motion to dismiss that "the fair market value of the subject property should be assessed in
light of the remaining encumbrances." See Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
at 2. In support of its argument, Plaintiff cited to applicable law, including Utah Code
§57-1-32 and City Consumer Servs. v. Peters. See Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss at 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon the allegations in the
plaintiffs complaint presents a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for
correctness." Osguthorpe v. Wolf ML Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, P10 (Utah 2010).
"A district court should only grant a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff is not
entitled to relief either under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove
to support their claim. Accordingly, when determining whether to grant a defendant's
motion to dismiss, a court must assume the truth of the allegations in the pleadings and
draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of the plaintiff." Gloria
Hayley Ashby v. Dallen Ben Ashby, 2010 UT 7, f 9 (Utah 2010).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
"At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as
provided in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to
recover the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as
security, and in that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness that was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was
4

sold, and the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. Before rendering
judgment, the court shall find the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's
fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred." Utah Code §57-1-32.
"Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of an
obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary. All
right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property acquired by the trustor, or the
trustor's successors in interest, subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, shall inure to
the trustee as security for the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is
conveyed as if acquired before execution of the trust deed." Utah Code §57-1-20.
'The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1 )(a)(i) or (iv) is given the
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in
the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without
express provision for it in the trust deed." Utah Code §57-1-23.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third District Court in a civil lawsuit
in which the plaintiff was seeking to obtain a deficiency judgment after foreclosing the
defendants' property through a third position deed of trust. The defendants prevailed at
the trial court on a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was based on the argument
that the fair market value of the real property involved in this dispute exceeded the
amount of indebtedness owed to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was therefore barred from
pursuing a deficiency judgment. Plaintiff argued that prior encumbrances need to be
considered when calculating the fair market value of real property foreclosed through a
secondary deed of trust. Plaintiffs argument was supported by citations to statutory
language, case law, and public policy. There are no related or prior appeals in this case.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Defendants signed a note, partially secured by a deed of trust, with Plaintiff as the
beneficiary. See Complaint at 5, 12, and 13.
2. Defendants defaulted on the note, and Plaintiff foreclosed on the property that was
partially secured by the deed of trust. See Complaint at 7, 10, 12, and 13.
3. At the time of the foreclosure auction, Defendants owed $1,491,295.89 to
Plaintiff. See Complaint at 12.
4. At the time of the foreclosure auction, the gross value of the foreclosed property
was $2,000,000.00, and the encumbrances with priority over Plaintiffs trust deed
totaled $1,159,617.81. See Complaint at 13.
6

5. Plaintiff purchased the trust deed's property with a bid of $1,000,000.00. See
Complaint at 11.
6. At the time of sale, the combined value of purchase price and the remaining
encumbrances was $2,159,617.81, which is $159,617.81 more than the trust
deed's property was worth. See Complaint at 11 and 13.
7. At the conclusion of the foreclosure auction, the balance still owing by Defendants
to Plaintiff was in the amount of $491,295.89. See Complaint at 14.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prior encumbrances should be considered when assessing the fair market value of
a property foreclosed through a junior deed of trust because:
1. In discussing deficiency judgments, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that fair
market value should be calculated according to the amount that the indebtedness
exceeds the security foreclosed. Whether an amount is secured or unsecured is
dependent on the prior encumbrances in the collateral, and Plaintiff's right to be
made whole cannot be destroyed by other encumbrances.
2. The "Fair market value" is what a person is willing to pay for the real property.
Prior encumbrances change what a person is willing to pay for the real property.
Therefore, prior encumbrances change the fair market value.
3. The court-stated public policy behind the deficiency limitation is to prevent the
lender from procuring a double recovery by bidding a menial amount for the
property at the foreclosure, then attempting to collect the entire remainder of the
7

debt owed on the promissory note. This policy would not be served by enforcing
the deficiency limitation as wrongly interpreted by the defendants.
4. Enforcing the deficiency limitation as wrongly interpreted by the defendants
would create bad public policy including making it substantially more difficult to
borrow and lend money in Utah, forcing lenders to bring lawsuits against debtors
in order to collect the entire amount owed to the lenders, and placing foreclosing
lenders in a position where they can only recover a percentage of what is justly
and duly owing to them.
5. Deficiency judgments are only limited in that the court may not render a judgment
in which the amount of the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the
property. Regardless of whether the fair market value considers the prior
encumbrances, Plaintiff is not asking for a judgment that exceeds the fair market
value of the property.
Based on each of these reasons individually, let alone cumulatively, Plaintiffs
appeal should be granted and its case remanded to the district court.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff and Appellant requests that the court overturn the motion to dismiss
granted by the district court. Plaintiff believes that the district court misapplied the
deficiency limitation set forth in Utah Code §57-1-32, which states:
"At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust
deed.. .an action may be commenced to recover the balance due... The
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the
amount of the indebtedness.. .exceeds the fair market value of the property
as of the date of the sale." Utah Code §57-1-32.
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Under this statute, the fair market value of the foreclosed property would include
the prior encumbrances that remain on the property after foreclosure.

I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT INDICATES THAT COURTS
SHOULD LOOK AT THE VALUE OF THE SECURITY IN
CALCULATING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT, AND THE VALUE
OF THE SECURITY IS CONTINGENT UPON THE HOW MUCH
OF THE COLLATERAL HAS BEEN ENCUMBERED PRIOR TO
THE SECURITY AT ISSUE.

The Utah Supreme Court explained the deficiency limitation as follows: "A
deficiency judgment after the sale of the security is limited to the amount by which the
amount of the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the security foreclosed on at
the time of foreclosure." City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah
1991)(underlining added for emphasis). Looking at the security rather than the
foreclosed property as a whole makes perfect sense because Plaintiff did not sell the
foreclosed property outright but simply sold Plaintiff's interest in the foreclosed property
which interest was in the third-position.
The court further explained: "If the security is lost or has become valueless at the
time the action is commenced, the debt is no longer secured." Id. at 237. The choice of
words by the court and subsequent explanation that we should look to whether there is
value to secure a debt is important. In the City Consumer case, the court did not treat all
trust deeds as equal. Rather, the court held that a junior encumbrance "should not be
denied full recovery of its debt since the security of the mortgaged land has entirely
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disappeared." Id. at 239 [quoting U. S. B. & M. Liquidation Corp. v. Hilton, 307 Mass.
114, 117 (Mass. 1940)].
The case at hand is similar to the City Consumer case. Due to the prior
encumbrances, Plaintiff's deed of trust was only partially secured. As a result of the
partial security, Plaintiff could not be made fully whole through foreclosure. As in the
City Consumer case, Plaintiffs right to be made whole is not destroyed simply because
there is another party with a greater right to the collateral than Plaintiff. The Plaintiff can
only be made whole after the Plaintiff receives sufficient compensation to be made
whole. Under the facts alleged in Plaintiffs complaint, Plaintiff would only recover half
of what it is owed by selling the property at its fair market value. Plaintiff is therefore
entitled to a deficiency.

II.

FAIR MARKET VALUE IS CALCULATED BASED ON WHAT A
PERSON WOULD ACTUALLY PAY FOR THE PROPERTY, AND
SINCE PRIOR ENCUMBRANCES CHANGE WHAT A PERSON
WILL PAY FOR THE PROPERTY, THESE ENCUMBRANCES
CHANGE THE FAIR MARKET VALUE.

'The accepted formula for determining fair market value is what would a
purchaser willing to buy, but not required to do so, pay; and what would a seller willing
to sell, but not required to do, ask." Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481,
489 (Utah 1979).
Encumbrances on property change what a party is willing to pay for a property.
The effect of encumbrances on purchase price is manifest in real estate purchase options.
For example, some properties are sold in wrap-around mortgages in which the buyer
10

merely assumes responsibility for the encumbrances on the property. Short-sales have
also become common-place. In a short sale, a property cannot be sold by traditional
means because the encumbrances on the property exceed the assessed value of the
property, and a buyer will not pay the assessed value for a property that would be
encumbered by pre-existing obligations after the purchase. In order to sell the home, the
encumbrance-holder must take a lesser amount than it is owed in exchange for releasing
its encumbrance. In both wrap-around mortgages and short-sales, the encumbrance has
an effect on what the buyer is willing to pay for a property.
Plaintiff is in a similar situation. A buyer at the foreclosure of a third-position deed
of trust would take the property subject to the pre-existing encumbrances. See Utah
Code §57-1-20 and Utah Code §57-1-23. In other words, in order to own the property
outright after purchasing the property at the foreclosure, the buyer would still need to pay
off the two encumbrances ahead of Plaintiffs third-position deed of trust.
Conversely, if the first-position deed of trust were foreclosed, then the buyer at the
first-position foreclosure sale would own the property outright. See Utah Code §57-1-20
and Utah Code §57-1-23. Due to the greater ownership right conveyed and the
extinguishing of the inferior encumbrances, the foreclosure of the first-position deed of
trust would fetch a higher price than the foreclosure of Plaintiffs third-position deed of
trust.
Plaintiffs argument in this section can be summarized in a classic "a=b, b=c, and
therefore, a=c" logic statement: The fair market value is what a person is willing to pay
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for the property. Prior encumbrances change what a person is willing to pay for the
property. Therefore, prior encumbrances change the fair market value.
Since, the prior encumbrances change the fair market value of the real property,
Plaintiff may collect the deficiency judgment owed by defendants.

III.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MADE A MENIAL OFFER FOR THE
PROPERTY AND IS NOT SEEKING DOUBLE RECOVERY, SO
USING THE DEFENDANTS9 INTERPRETATION OF "FAIR
MARKET VALUE" WOULD NOT FURTHER THE COURTSTATED POLICY BEHIND THE DEFICIENCY LIMITATION.

Citing other courts in support of its position, the Utah Supreme Court explained
the policy behind the deficiency limitation in Utah Code §57-1-32:
"The purpose of the fair market provision of section 57-1-32 'is to protect
the debtor, who in a non-judicial foreclosure has no right of redemption,
from a creditor who could purchase the property at the sale for a low price
and then hold the debtor liable for a large deficiency, (fair market value
provisions 'designed to prevent creditors from buying in at their own sales
at deflated prices and realizing double recoveries by holding debtors for
large deficiencies')." Id. at 238 (quoting First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Felger,
658 F. Supp. 175, 183 (D. Utah 1987) and Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino,
378 P.2d 97, 99 (Cal. 1963).
In the case before this court, Plaintiff did not place a menial bid for the property
and is not seeking double recovery. In fact, if Plaintiff was to sell the property for the
assessed value, Plaintiff would receive in total about $840,000 in compensation, which is
just over half of what Plaintiff is owed (even though $1,000,000.00 would be accredited
against the Defendants' amount owing due to Plaintiffs excessive credit bid). This is not
a situation in which Plaintiff has been made whole and is seeking a double recovery; this
is a situation in which Plaintiff has not been made whole. Treating secondary
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encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would not further the court-stated policy
behind the deficiency limitation.

IV.

USING THE DEFENDANTS9 INTERPRETATION OF "FAIR
MARKET VALUE" WOULD CREATE BAD PUBLIC POLICY
THAT WOULD: 1. MAKE IT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE
DIFFICULT TO BORROW AND LEND MONEY IN UTAH, 2.
FORCE LENDERS TO JUDICIALLY FORECLOSE BY BRINGING
A LAWSUIT AGAINST DEBTORS TO COLLECT THE FULL
AMOUNT OWING, AND 3. PLACE FORECLOSING LENDERS IN
A POSITION WHERE THEY CAN ONLY RECOVER A
PERCENTAGE OF WHAT IS JUSTLY AND DULY OWING TO
THEM.

Treating secondary encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would create
bad public policy. First, it would make it substantially more difficult to borrow and lend
money. A creditor would only be willing to extend a loan if there was an excessive
amount of collateral after the prior encumbrances. In today's current market, it is
impossible to watch the news without seeing repeated stories on the difficulty in taking
out loans and the negative impact this difficulty has had on the economy. Treating
secondary encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would exasperate this problem.
Second, if non-judicially foreclosing on a property would cause a lender to forfeit
its right to full recovery, then lenders would be forced to judicially foreclose by bringing
a lawsuit against debtors to collect the full amount owing. This approach would be
detrimental to the creditors who suffer increased costs and delays, to the debtors who will
be forced to defend against lawsuits and pay the increased costs, and to the courts who
would be burdened by the influx of cases.
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Third, treating secondary encumbrances like first-position encumbrances would
hinder the enforcement of contracts. Under contract law, lenders are entitled to full
recovery under the terms in which they loan out money. If the court treats secondary
encumbrances like first-position encumbrances, then secondary lenders will be placed in
a precarious situation in which they will have to choose between attempting to collect the
amount owed and non-judicially collecting through the partially-securing collateral.
Some lenders will collect through the collateral and forfeit their rights. This danger of
forfeiture is particularly unfair to lenders who have foreclosed or are foreclosing on
property without knowledge that they are forfeiting their claim to the entire amount that
they are owed. Lenders should be allowed to enforce their contracts to collect the entire
amount they are owed and collect on the collateral that secures these contracts.

V.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ASKING FOR A JUDGMENT THAT
EXCEEDS THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY,
AND THEREFORE, THE DEFICIENCY LIMITATION DOES NOT
APPLY.

Finally, the defendants have asked the court to read the deficiency limitation very
strictly. Under a strict reading, the deficiency limitation only limits that "the court may
not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness.. .exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale."
Utah Code §57-1-32. In the matter at hand, Plaintiff's complaint does not ask the court
to grant a judgment for more than the amount that the amount of indebtedness exceeded
the fair market value at the date of the sale. Plaintiffs complaint asks for judgment in the
amount of $491,295.89, which is less than the fair market value of the property under
14

either the defendants' or the Plaintiffs calculations. Under the strict reading advocated
by the defendants, Plaintiff would still be able to collect on its deficiency judgment.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff should be allowed to collect on the deficiency owed after foreclosing on
its third-position deed of trust. The encumbrances ahead of Plaintiff changed what a
person would pay for the securing property and thereby changed the fair market value of
the securing property. Using the encumbrances in calculating the fair market value is in
line with the Utah Supreme Court's approach when it stated that courts need to look at
the particular security in the foreclosed property and that a lender should be entitled to
full recovery when another encumbrance prevented the lender from being secured. The
policy behind the deficiency limitation, specifically preventing lenders from obtaining
double recovery by bidding low amounts at a foreclosure, would not be furthered by
ignoring the prior encumbrances and forcing the Plaintiff to forfeit half of its claim.
Additionally, it would create bad policy for the court to prevent Plaintiff from seeking a
deficiency judgment in that it would make borrowing and lending money more difficult,
increase litigation for loans, and prevent lenders from being able to enforce their
contracts and collect the entire amount owed. Finally, the deficiency limitation only
prevents Plaintiff from seeking a judgment for more than the indebtedness exceeds the
fair market value of the property, and Plaintiff is seeking a judgment for less than the fair
market value of the property.
Plaintiff humbly requests that the court grant its appeal and remand this case back
to the district court.
15

lisG^t day of J«»? 2010
Dated thiskyt^

Stephen W. Whiti
Attorney for Ap
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellate Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant
by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, postage prepaid, on this
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day of June

2010, to the following:
Shawn W. Potter
Tesch Law Office, P.C.
314 Main Street, Suite 200
Park City, UT 84060
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File No. 90029052
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SUMMIT

APR 0 8 2010
FILED B Y _

BRYAN W. CANNON #0561
STEPHEN W. WHITING #11828
BRYAN W. CANNON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorney for Creditor
8619 S. Sandy Parkway, Ste. Ill
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801)255-7475
Facsimile: (801) 255-7526
File Reference No. 90020052
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMIT COUNTY, SILVER SUMMIT DEPARTMENT
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL
SERVICES
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
DEFENDANTS

vs.
JORDANELLE DEVELOPMENT LLC, A
COLORADO LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY, JARED M. JENSON, AND
BRUCE RICHES

Civil No. 090500770
JUDGE LUBECK

Defendant.
Comes now the court and pursuant to the stipulation of the parties and the court's ruling on
Defendants' motion to dismiss, grants an award of attorney's fees against Plaintiff and in favor of
Defendants in the amount of $2 J 60.00.
DATED this

day of April, 2010.

The Honorable Judge Lubeck1
Approved as to form by:

lawn Potter
"Attorney for Defendants

ADDENDUM B
MEMORANDUM DECISION

20

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff,

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 090500770

vs.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK

JORDANELLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
JARED M. JENSEN; and BRUCE
RICHES,

DATE: January 26, 2010

Defendants.
The above matter came before the court on January 12, 2010
for oral argument on defendants' motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff was present through Stephen W. Whiting and
defendants were present through Shawn W. Potter.

Defendants filed this motion on September 29, 2009.
Plaintiff filed an opposition response on October 14, 2009.
Defendants filed a reply on October 15, 2009, as well as a
request to submit.

Based thereon oral argument was scheduled.

Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties.

Since

taking the issues under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the issues.

Now being

fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint September 2, 2009.

It alleged a

deficiency after a trustee's sale of property and sought
$491,295.89 plus interests and costs of sale.
This motion followed.

ARGUMENTS
Defendants move to dismiss under URCP, Rule 12(b)(6).
Defendants allege that on July 31, 2009, a trustee's sale
occurred and plaintiff was the highest bidder in the sum of $1
million.

The complaint alleges that the property was worth $2

million, with prior liens at just over $1.1 million.
Based on those claims, the Utah statute limits deficiency
judgments by requiring offset of the fair market value such that
if the amount of indebtedness does not exceed the fair market
value, there is no deficiency.

UCA 57-1-32. Defendants also ask

for attorney fees.

In opposition plaintiff alleges there are two encumbrances
on the property after the sale; a deed of trust of October 1,
2004 and one of August 10, 2005.
third position.

The foreclosed loan was in the

The amount due and owing on the first loan was

-2-

$560,849 and on the second $451,444.
Plaintiff agrees that a deficiency is limited to the amount
by which the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value, but
asserts the fair market value should be assessed in light of
remaining encumbrances.

The balance of the two prior liens owing

was just over $1 million.

Subtracting that from the fair market

value of $2 million, brings the actual fair market value below
the $1 million paid by plaintiff.

In reply defendants argue that encumbrances do not offset
the fair market value.

UCA 57-1-32 does not define fair market

value, but the term means what a willing buyer and willing seller
would allow for property to change hands.

No cases nor statutes

define fair market value as plaintiff asserts.

The purpose of

UCA 57-1-32 is to protect a debtor, who has no right of
redemption, from a creditor who could buy low and seek a large
deficiency judgment.

DISCUSSION
"A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged
in the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief
based on those facts."
Hosp.,
Pleading

St. Benedict1s

Dev.

Co. v. St.

Benedict's

811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)(citing 61A Am. Jur. 2d
§ 227 (1981)).

Accordingly, the court must determine

o-

whether, assuming the facts as alleged in the Plaintiff's
complaint as true, they have failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

Assuming the facts as stated by Plaintiffs as true, they
have failed to assert a claim for a deficiency judgment under the
Utah law.

>N

When faced with an issue of statutory construction,

we look first to the plain language of the statute and assume
that each of its terms was used advisedly.''
v.

Smith,

Surety

Life

Ins.

Co.

892 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1995).

Before rendering a deficiency judgment,
the court shall find the fair market value of
the property at the date of sale. The court
may not render judgment for more than the
amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness with interest, costs, and
expenses of sale, including trustee's and
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market
value of the property as of the date of the
sale.
UCA 57-1-32 (2009) .

The statute plainly states "a deficiency

judgment after the sale of the security is limited to the amount
by which the amount of the indebtedness exceeds the fair market
value of the security foreclosed on at the time of foreclosure.7'
City

Consumer

Servs.

v.

Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1991)

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a deficiency judgment
-4-

only if the amount of Defendants' indebtedness on Plaintiff's
loan, with interest, and the trustee's fees and costs, exceed the
fair market value of the property at the date of the sale.
57-1-32.

UCA

Defendant's obligation was $1,491,295.89 and the

trustee's fees and costs were $1,152.88.

Even with the interest,

these do not exceed the fair market value of $2,000,000.

The fair market value does not include the prior
encumbrances on the property under Utah law or even based on
common sense as Plaintiff asserts.

Although not defined in Title

57 of the Utah Code, it is well-established under Utah law that
the fair market value is "the amount at which property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts."

UCA 59-2-102.

Plaintiff, as the highest bidder at the trustee sale, and any
other potential buyer, had known about the prior encumbrances and
presumably took that into consideration along with the fair
market value of the property.

The fact that Plaintiff ended up

in the present situation was a risk they took as a third-position
lender.

Additionally, as Defendants state, "the purpose of the
deficiency purpose of the fair market provision of section

-5-

57-1-32 'is to protect the debtor, who in a non-judicial
foreclosure has no right of redemption, from a creditor who could
purchase the property at the sale for a low price and then hold
Peters,

the debtor liable for a large deficiency.'"
238 (quoting First Sec.

Bank

of

Utah,

N.A.

v.

815 P.2d at

Felger, 658 F.

Supp. 175, 183 (D. Utah 1987)),

Finally, as the prevailing party, Defendants are entitled to
reasonable costs and attorney fees:

M

In any action brought under

this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect
its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred."

UCA 57-1-32

On this basis the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff's deficiency action.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required. However, defendant is to prepare an order
awarding attorney fees to defendant, with the amount blank.
should be supported by an affidavit sufficient under Rule 73.
Plaintiff may object to the affidavit and the court will then

-6-

It

fill in the blank as to fees awarded.

DATED th i

s

^

, 2010,

day of_

BY THE.COURT

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUD-

-7-
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